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You.r Money .or Your Wife's?: 
Soczal Securzty Changes Considered 
by Neal Devins 




(Docket No. 82-1050) 
To be argued December 5, 1983 
Congress's ability to solve the financial difficulties of 
~e social security trust fund is one of several significant 
Issues to be addressed by the Supreme Court in Heckler 
v. Mathews. The Heckler case also calls into question how 
Congress can respond to the judiciary's invalidation of 
legislation on the grounds that it is gender-based and 
thus violates the Fifth Amendment equal protection 
clause. Specifically, the Heckler case will determine: 1) 
whether Congress can protect the expectation interest of 
retirees by making use of an unconstitutional gender-
based classification relied on by those retirees and 2) 
whether Congress can protect its fiduciary interest in the 
social security trust fund by way of a "grandfather" 
severability clause which has the practical effect of deny-
ing monetary relief to an individual who successfully 
challenges the constitutionality of the legislation. 
Social security payments are central to the retirement 
plans of most Americans. According to one study: "For 
the great majority of Americans, the most important 
form of household wealth is the anticipated social secu-
rity retirement benefits." Additionally, since social secu-
rity is often viewed as a substitute for retirement savings, 
many people will reduce private savings during their 
lifetime in anticipation of these benefits. In ensuring the 
stability of the social security trust fund, Congress can 
enact legislation to ensure the equitable distribution 
from this fund. At the same time, Congress must protect 
the reasonable expectations of individuals affected by its 
amendment of social security laws. Whether Congress 
can seek to protect these expectation interests, while at 
the same time protecting the trust fund, by reenacting 
an unconstitutional gender-based classification is the 
subject of Heckler. 
Neal Devins is a research associate at the Institute for Public 
Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University, 1208 Avenue South, 
Nashville, TN 37212; telephone (615) 322-8540. 
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FACTS 
The Heckler lawsuit involves a government appeal to 
a ruling that certain portions of the 1977 Social Security 
Act are unconstitutional- a ruling made by the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of 
Alabama. 
The Social Security Act provides spousal benefits for 
the wives, husbands, widows and widowers of retired 
and disabled wage earners. Spousal benefits are based 
on the earnings of the retired or disabled wage earner. 
Prior to December of 1977, the Act demanded that men 
seeking spousal benefits demonstrate dependency on 
their wage-earner wives for one-half of their support. 
Women, on the other hand, could qualify for benefits 
without having to make a similar demonstraton of de-
pendency on their husbands. 
In March of 1977, the Supreme Court, in Califano v. 
Goldfarb, (430 U.S. 199, 97 S.Ct 1021, 51 L.Ed. 2d 270 
( 1977)), held this gender-based dependency test 
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. The Court concluded that the 
male-only dependency test resulted in the wOrk of fe-
males (whose husbands had to prove dependency) pro-
viding less protection to their families in the form of 
benefits than the work of males (whose wives automati-
cally received the government pension). To eliminate 
this inequity, the Court invalidated the male-only proof 
of dependency requirement. 
In response to this decision, Congress, in December 
1977, amended the Social Security Act. First, Congress 
eliminated the male-only dependency test. Second, Con-
gress enacted a "pension offset" provision which re-
quired that spousal benefits be reduced by federal/state 
government pensions. This offset provision was de-
signed to rectify the substantial increase in social security 
payments caused by the elimination of the dependency 
test. According to a Senate report: "[Elimination of the 
dependency test) result[ed) in 'windfall' benefits to some 
retired government employees which would [cost the 
government approximately $190 million in 1979)." 
Third, apparently concerned about the effect of the new 
offset provisions on those persons (women and men who 
could provide dependency) who had planned their re-
tirements on the assumption that they would receive full 
unreduced spousal benefits, Congress chose to exclude 
this group of individuals from the pension offset re-
quirement for a five-year grace period. To effectuate 
this, Congress incorporated into the offset exception the 
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dependency test found unconstitutional in Goldfarb. 
Fourth, Congress, recognizing that the dependency test 
might be invalidated, included a severability clause in 
the December, 1977 legislation. This provision would 
have nullified the "pension offset" exception if the de-
pendency test was found unconstitutional in this con-
text. 
Robert Mathews, who retired in November, 1977, 
from his job with the Post Office, challenged the consti-
tutionality of the "pension offset" exception. Prior to 
retirement, Mathews inquired at the local social security 
office as to whether he would be eligible for spousal 
benefits. He was advised that as a result of Goldfarb, he 
was entitled to such benefits without proof of depen-
dency on his wife. Yet, Mathews' December, 1977 appli-
cation for spousal benefits was ultimately rejected since 
he did not establish dependency and thus was subject to 
the offset provision. 
Mathews based his challenge to the exceptions clause 
of the offset provision on three distinct grounds. First, 
he alleged that the exceptions clause should be inter-
preted without incorporating the gender-based depen-
dency test. Central to this argument was the fact that the 
exceptions clause was based on "requirements ... being 
administered in January, 1977." At that time, the Social 
Security Administration was delayng any decision on 
whether to grant benefits until the Supreme Court ren-
dered a decision in Goldfarb. Consequently, applications 
made in january, 1977, ultimately did not require proof 
of dependency since Goldfarb effectively eliminated that 
requirement. In further support of this claim, Mathews 
argued that Congress should be presumed to act in 
accordance with Goldfarb. The government sought to 
counter this claim by introducing a substantial amount 
- evidence of Congressional reports and Congressional 
debate - which indicated that Congress sought only to 
protect the expectation interest of individuals who relied 
on the male-only proof of dependency statute, not those 
individuals who, like Mathews, relied on Goldfarb. The 
district court agreed with the government on this issue. 
Consequently, the Court had to rule on the constitu-
tional equal protection challenge. 
Governmental discrimination on the basis of sex is a 
significant evil protected against by the equal protection 
clauses (Fifth Amendment equal protection clause for 
federal action; Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion clause for state/local action). Fearful of preventing 
"the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccu-
rate assumptions abut the proper roles of men and 
women," the Supreme Court demands that a gender-
based distinction: 1) serve an important governmental 
objective, and 2) is substantially related to the achieve-
ment of that objective. If these two criteria are not met, 
the gender-based classification will be found unconstitu-
tional. 
Mathews' equal protection challenge to the excep-
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tions provision is primarily based on the failure of the 
gender-based offset exception to serve an important 
governmental objective. Contrary to this position, the 
government stressed "the significance of social security 
benefits to people who had planned their retirements in 
accordance with pre-Goldfarb rules." The district court 
agreed with Mathews and invalidated the gender-based 
exception clause, noting that: "Congress, in requiring 
that men prove dependency, presumed that women 
would have relied upon the practices of the Social Secu-
rity Administration, yet men would not have relied upon 
a decision of the Supreme Court.'' 
Mathews' final argument was an attack against the 
constitutionality of the severability clause. There were 
two components to this argument. First, the severability 
clause, by requiring women to prove dependency, den-
ies Mathews an adequate remedy for an unconstitutio-
nally inflicted injury. In other words, "men can vindicate 
their constitutional right to equal protection only by 
causing others to forfeit benefits they have been pre-
viously entitled to." Second, the severability clause is an 
improper restriction on court jurisdiction since it prohi-
bits a reviewing court from granting adequate relief with 
the concomitant result of destroying Mathews' standing 
to maintain the suit. The government's retort to is alle-
gation was that "denial of benefits to correct the gender-
based discrimination - is not part of the federal consti-
tutional right of equal protection." The district court 
agreed with Mathews - labeling the severability provi-
sion an "a droit attempt to discourage the bringing of an 
action by destroying standing ... [and thus insulating] 
the legislative work product from judicial scrutiny. •· 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Heckler v. Mathews raises fundamental questions 
about Congress's authority over spending programs, the 
manner in which Congress may restrict federal court 
remedies, and the centrality of gender-based discrimina-
tion in equal protection jurisprudence. Were the Su-
preme Court to affirm the district court ruling, Heckler 
would force the Congress either to: 1) forego protecting 
the reliance interest of women who based their retire-
ment decisions on pre-Goldfarb law, or 2) grant men an 
exemption to the pension offset without proof of depen-
dency and thereby expend approximately 190 million 
per year over the five-year offset exception period. By 
forcing Congress to make such a decision, this result 
would severely limit Congress's ability to respond prag-
matically to a court ruling. However, if the Supreme 
Court were to overturn the district court ruling, the 
Court would be forced to either limit the government's 
burden of proof in a gender-based discrimination claim 
or recognize broad Congressional authority to limit fed-
eral court remedial authority without resort to the juris-
diction limiting provisions of the Constitution. 
On the surface, Congress's reinstitution of the gen-
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der-based distinction found unconstitutional in Goldfarb 
would appear per se unconstitutional. Yet, Goldfarb was 
decided when passage of the Equal Rights Amendment 
seemed imminent. Today, the Court might be somewhat 
more deferential to the legislature to its determination 
of what constitutes a "substantial government interest." 
As amici, American Federation of Government Employ-
ees noted: "[Congress properly] did not include nonde-
pendent husbands whose period of entitlement had 
lasted only the nine months between the Goldfarb deci-
sion and enactment of the public pension offset. To 
have given them a five-year window ... would have been 
to give them a windfall without a rational basis." Coun-
tering this view, amici American Civil Liberties Union 
urged the Court to abide by the Goldfarb view ''that 
gender-based discrimination casts the weight of the gov-
ernment on the side of traditional noting about male/fe-
male behavior, shows artificial barriers to the attainment 
by women and men of full human potential and retards 
society's progress toward equal opportunity." 
The separation of powers raised in Heckler is novel 
and significant. Dating back to the Supreme Court's 
seminal decision in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137, 2 
L.Ed. 60 (1803)), judicial review implicates that courts 
will have authority to review Congress's actions. Yet, by 
necessarily denying Mathews' claim for relief vis-a-vis 
the severability provision, Congress's 1977 amendment 
to the Social Security Act, if upheld, could prevent 
Mathews from pursuing his claim. Additionally, Con-
gressional restrictions on court remedial authority is 
properly based in the exceptions clause of Article III of 
the Constitution - not through a severability provision 
in some legislative enactment. Still, it is clear that Con-
gress could have mandated that which the severability 
provision requires -namely, that women prove depen-
dency. Cosequently, there is some merit to the govern-
ment's reliance on a 1976 Supreme Court decision 
which held that: "Government decisions to spend money 
to improve the general public welfare in one way and 
not another are 'not confined to the courts.' The discre-
tion belongs to Congress.'' 
ARGUMENTS 
For Men Challenging Proof of Dependency Test 
1. The exception clause of the pension offset provision 
should be interpreted without incorporating refer-
ence to the gender-based dependency test since appli-
cations filed in January, 1977, were granted without 
regard to proof of dependency. 
2. The protection of gender-based reliance interests is 
not the type of important governmental objective 
which can be used to justify a gender-based distinc-
tion. 
Issue No. 10 
3. Exclusion of individuals relying on the Goldfarb deci-
sion from the exceptions clause violates the equal 
protection guarantee and thus the exceptions clause 
is not substantially related to the legitimate govern-
ment interest in the protection of reliance interest of 
retirees. 
4. The severability clause, by requiring that women 
prove dependency and thereby denying monetary 
relief to men workers, denies men workers' right to 
an adequate remedy for an unconstitutionally 
inflicted injury. 
5. By preventing the granting of adequate relief and 
thereby denying men workers' right to pursue a claim 
in court, the severability clause is an unconstitutional 
attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. 
For the Government 
1. The pension offset exception was intended by Con-
gress, as evidenced in Congressional testimony and 
protests, to incorporate the gender-based depen-
dency standard. 
2. The exception clause substantially serves the impor-
tant governmental objective of protecting the reliance 
interests of individuals whose decision to retire was 
based on pre-Goldfarb law. 
3. People who qualified for spousal benefits only as a 
result of Goldfarb had no reliance interest to be pro-
tected, and thus, the exceptions clause is specifically 
and precisely tailored to that group of individuals 
with legitimate reliance interests. 
4. The severability clause is a legitimate exercise of Con-
gress's power of the purse and thus does not impro-
perly limit either men workers' remedial rights or 
court jurisdiction. 
AMICUS BRIEFS 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Men Workers 
The American Civil Liberties Union, the National 
Women's Law Center, Older Women's League, Pension 
Rights Center, Women's Equity Action League, and 
Women's Legal Defense Fund filed a joint amicus brief 
arguing in favor of men workers. 
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Government 
The American Federation of Government Employ-
ees (AFL-CIO) and Minnesota Congressman James 
Obepster filed a joint brief in support of the constitu-
tionality of the pension offset exception. The brief did 
not address the statutory interpretation or severability 
clause issues. 
197 
